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BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE:
WRITERS AND ACTORS NAVIGATE
HOLLYWOOD'S ROUGH ROADS TO
EMPLOYMENT DURING LABOR STRIKES
Adam Levin and Jenny Schneider Li*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2001, the show may not go on. Motion picture and
television producers confront the prospect of potential strikes by the
Writers Guild of America ("WGA") and the Screen Actors Guild ("SAG"),
whose collective bargaining agreements expire on May 1 and June 30,
2001, respectively.'
As summer approaches, actors and writers, as well as others who
support Hollywood's motion picture and television industry, likewise face
uncertainty and potential financial hardship.2 If new agreements are not
reached, one or both of the guilds may order their respective members to
cease performing services in connection with ongoing or imminent
theatrical and television productions. As a result, paychecks will stop, and
difficult decisions will likely follow. Non-union productions, which,
during a labor dispute, continue to produce movies and television shows to
satiate the public's appetite for entertainment, present tempting
* Adam Levin is a Partner, and Jenny Schneider Li is an Associate, in the Labor Department
of Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp LLP. Mr. Levin and Ms. Li represent employers, including
those in the motion picture and television industry, in all facets of labor and employment law.
They also represent performers in matters involving the relationship between performers and their
unions. The authors thank Labor Department partner William Cole for his ideas and comments,
and Labor Department associates Suzanne Steinke and Aymara Zielina for their research, all of
which contributed significantly to this Article.
1. Patricia Ward Biederman and Kristina Saverwein, Writers Fear for Their Finances,
Careers, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2001, at B1.
2. Darrell Saltzman, After Record Growth, Entertainment, Industry, Local Economy Could
Be Hit Hard ifActors, Writers Stage Threatened Strikes, L.A. BUS. J., Dec. 25, 2000, at 14.
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alternatives. However, work on even one non-union production has serious
consequences for union members.
This Article generally addresses a union member's relationship with,
and obligations to, a union during a strike, and how a union member may
choose to work for a struck or non-union employer without incurring union
discipline by assuming "financial core status." Although the concept of
"financial core status" discussed in Part II is not new,4 the upcoming
potential strikes again bring the issue into focus. Thus, this Article
continues by addressing financial core status as a legal concept: what
unions and employers may tell employees about their right to assume
financial core status, the benefits and burdens of assuming financial core
status, and the importance of timing in selecting financial core status.
The Article then addresses the dilemma confronting so-called
"hyphenates" during a strike. Hyphenates are a class of employees
somewhat unique to the motion picture and television industry in that they
are supervisors and managers who also are members of a union-the
WGA.5 As such, they engage in supervisorial work, which is not covered
under the WGA Agreement, as well as "rank-and-file" work, which is
covered. As union members, hyphenates may be called upon by their
union to strike. However, as supervisors, hyphenates may be required by
their employers to cross picket-lines to perform not only their supervisorial
tasks, but also the work normally done by striking writers. Thus, the
pressures upon hyphenates during a strike are compounded, and may
provide an even greater incentive for them to assume financial core status.
3. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS art. XIV (Mar. 1999) [hereinafter
SAG CONST.]; WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS art. X, pt. A,
§ 1 (revised Sept. 16, 1992) [hereinafter WGA CONST. I .
4. See, e.g., Lionel S. Sobel, The Origins and Evolution of "Financial Core" Union
Membership and Its Significance in the Entertainment Industry, 7 ENT. L. REP. 3, 4 (Dec. 1988);
Ronald Turner, "'Membership" Obligations Under NLRA Section 8(a)(3): A Proposal for
Statutory Change, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 323, 327-30 (2000).
5. 1998 WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA-ALLIANCE OF MOTION PICTURE & TELEVISION
PRODUCERS THEATRICAL AND TELEVISION BASIC AGREEMENT art. 14 § A (AMPTP ed., 1998)
[hereinafter WGA AGREEMENT].
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II. BACKGROUND: UNION CONSTITUTIONS, STRIKE ORDERS AND
FINANCIAL CORE STATUS
A. Union Constitutions and Strike Orders-The Ties that Bind
Like all labor unions, SAG and the WGA have promulgated union
constitutions governing their relationship with their respective members.6
By joining the unions, actors and writers agree to be bound by the
constitutions and the rules set forth therein.7 Those rules prohibit members
from working on non-union productions, or for struck employers.8
Specifically, Rule 1 of SAG's Constitution states:
No member shall work as a performer or make an agreement to
work as a performer for any producer who has not executed a
basic minimum agreement with the Guild which is in full force
and effect .... No member shall perform any services as a
performer nor make an agreement to perform services as a
performer for any producer against whom the Guild is
conducting a strike, nor shall any member otherwise violate any
strike order of the Guild.9
The WGA Constitution contains similar limitations that are even
broader in scope:
Any member of the Guild... who shall be found guilty, after a
hearing in accordance with procedures in this Article X or
adopted by the Board, of crossing a primary picket line of the
Guild or of any act or failure to act or any conduct which is
prejudicial to the welfare of the Guild or of unfair dealing with
another member of the Guild, or with an employer or purchaser
or licensee of his/her material, or of failing to observe the
Constitution and By-Laws of this Guild, or any work rules or
strike rules of the Guild, or any lawful order of the Board, or of
failing to abide by the requirements of any collective bargaining
agreement or code of fair practice to which the Guild is party...
6. See generally, SAG CONST., supra note 3; WGA CONST., supra note 3.
7. See generally, SAG CONST., supra note 3; WGA CONST., supra note 3.
8. WGA CONST, supra note 3, art. X, pt. A, § 1; SAG CONST., supra note 3, art. XIV, § 3.
9. SAG CONST. supra note 3, Rule 1. Some SAG members have asked SAG's national
board to step-up enforcement of Rule I by disciplining members who work abroad, especially in
Canada, on non-union productions. Dave McNary, Harper Urges SAG Brethren To Avoid Non-
Union Pacts, DAILY VARIETY, Mar. 6, 2001, at 6. It has been reported that SAG may attempt to
expand the scope of the SAG Constitution to explicitly forbid work on foreign, non-union
productions.
2001]
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may be suspended, declared not in good standing, expelled from
membership in the Guild, be asked to resign, be censured, fined
or otherwise disciplined, or any combination of the foregoing.'0
In addition, the WGA Constitution provides: "Writers of scab scripts 1
may, if members of the Guild, be punished by expulsion, by suspension, by
a fine, or by a combination of the foregoing.' 2 The WGA Constitution
also prohibits a writer from ever knowingly rewriting a scab script."
Actors and writers cannot violate these covenants with impunity.
Under the SAG and WGA Constitutions, if a union member performs
struck work, or otherwise violates a rule, that member may face an internal
disciplinary hearing. 14 If the member is found guilty of a violation, the
union may impose discipline upon the member, including fines, suspension
or expulsion. 15 The union may attempt to enforce any fine it imposes
through a state court action.
6
B. Financial Core Status: The Great Escape
A union's constitution is, in essence, a contract between the union and
its members.17 Accordingly, when union membership ends, the contract
ceases to have force or effect.
As discussed in depth in Section IV.A, some union members do not
want to assume the obligations attendant to union membership and instead
elect financial core status. 18 A union member gains financial core status
when that member resigns from the union, but continues to pay initiation
fees and monthly dues in an amount necessary to support the union's
collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance adjustment
10. WGA CONST. art. X, pt. A, § 1.
11. "Scab scripts" are defined as stories, teleplays, scripts or the like "written on order or
request of or submitted to a producer ... as to which the Guild is on strike at the time of the
writing or submission." Id. § 3.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. WGA CONST. art. X, pts. A, B; SAG CONST. art. XIV, §§ 3, 4.
15. WGA CONST. art. X, § 1; SAG CONST. art. XIV, §§ 1, 2.
16. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 74 (1973), rev'g, 459 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
17. See SAG CONST. art. II. (stating SAG's objectives); WGA CONST. art. II (stating
WGA's objectives).
18. Financial core status is sometimes referred to as "resigning" from the union, and
workers on financial core status referred to as "non-members." However, to differentiate between
true non-members and those who pay some portion of union dues and fees, such status will be
referred to as "financial core status" and those individuals will be referred to as "financial core
dues payors."
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efforts on that member's behalf.' 9 Because financial core dues payors are
not bound to abide by the union's constitution, they may work during a
strike without the threat of union discipline. E° Moreover, a financial core
dues payor remains entitled to all of the benefits guaranteed by the
collective bargaining agreement, and neither the union nor the employer
may discriminate against an employee for electing financial core status.
2'
However, by resigning from the union, financial core dues payors lose
many union membership benefits, including the right to vote on ratification
of a collective bargaining agreement, hold a union office, and attend union
meetings.
22
C. A Preview: The 2000 Screen Actors Guild Commercials Strike
The recent commercials strike by SAG and the American Federation
of Television and Radio Artists ("AFTRA") illustrates the significant
impact of labor strikes on performers.23 Beginning in May 2000, actors
represented by SAG and AFTRA engaged in a six-month strike of the
advertising industry, which was one of the longest talent walkouts in
24history. By the time the strike ended in October 2000, SAG members had
lost more that $100 million in income. 5 Furthermore, the Los Angeles
economy had suffered an estimated $125 million in lost production, and an
additional $103 million in related losses, such as camera rentals and
catering.
E6
One facet of the 2000 commercials strike garnering significant media
attention was the relationship between unions and their members, and the
concomitant rights and obligations of both. Many performers received an
education about union rules when SAG fined golfer Tiger Woods $100,000
for appearing during the strike in a non-union advertisement for Buick.27
19. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963), rev'g 303 F.2d 482 (6th Cir.
1962).
20. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
22. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. at 737.
23. Dave McNary, Sag Snags an Ad Deal: Tentative Pact Brings End to Hollywood's
Longest Strike, DAILY VARIETY, Oct. 23 2000, at 1.
24. Id.
25. Actors Resolve Strike over Pay Issues Involve Net, Cable Ads, SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 24
2000, at 7A; Actors Strike Took Big Bite of Earnings, THE TORONTO SUN, Mar. 26, 2001, at 50.
26. Actors Resolve Strike over Pay Issues Involve Net, supra note 25; see also, Greg
Johnson, Can Settlement Lure Runaway Production Home?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2000, at A 10.
27. Dave McNary, SAG Tees off on Woods, DAILY VARIETY, Nov. 10, 2000, at 1
[hereinafter McNary, SAG Tees oJft. SAG agreed to waive one-half of that fine as long as Woods
did not perform struck work during a five-year probationary period. Press Release, Tiger Woods
2001]
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Other celebrities fared better. Los Angeles Laker Center, Shaquille
O'Neal, faced possible union discipline after filming an instant "I'm going
to Disneyland!" spot when the Lakers won the NBA championship on June
19, 2000.8 Upon release of the commercial, SAG issued a statement
declaring it was "deeply disappointed" with O'Neal's decision to perform
struck work, and that O'Neal's name would be added to a list of other
violators.29 However, after discussions with O'Neal's representatives, and
after O'Neal issued a statement in support of the union,30 SAG declined to
formally discipline O'Neal, citing O'Neal's "hurt feelings" as discipline
enough.3'
Some actors, seeking to avoid union discipline for filming
commercials during the strike, assumed financial core status. 32  For
example, SAG member Dave Thomas, the founder and chairman of
Wendy's restaurants, initially refrained from making any Wendy's
commercials during the strike. 33  However, by October 2000, Thomas
Appears Before SAG Trial Board To Answer Charges of Performing Stuck Work During Recent
Commercials Strike, at http://www.sag.org/pressreleases/pr-la001207.html (Dec. 7, 2000).
Actress-model Elizabeth Hurley was fined $100,000 after shooting a commercial for Estee
Lauder on July 11, 2000. Hurley apologized for her actions, and explained that she was unaware
that she was strike-breaking. Dave McNary, SAG Reduces Sanctions for Scabs in Ad Strike,
DAILY VARIETY, Feb. 7, 2001, at 2 [hereinafter McNary, SAG Reduces Sanctions]; Duncan
Campbell, Hollywood Strike: Bedazzled, Bothered and Bewildered: When Liz Hurley Turned up
for the Premiere of Her Latest Film She Faced Taunts of 'Scab' from Pickets of the Screen
Actors' Guild, OBSERVER, Oct. 22, 2000, at 20. Hurley also donated $25,000 to the strikers, but
this gesture did not stop the strike supporters from protesting at the premiere of her film,
Bedazzled, with signs reading "Elizabeth Scably, U Make Me Hurl," and "Beauty Fades, Honor
Doesn't." Duncan Campbell, Hollywood Strike: Bedazzled, Bothered and Bewildered: When Liz
Hurley Turned up for the Premiere of Her Latest Film She Faced Taunts of 'Scab 'from Pickets of
the Screen Actors' Guild, OBSERVER, Oct. 22, 2000, at 20.
28. Roger Armbrust, Tempers Flair, Resolve Affirmed as Strike Extends, BACK STAGE, at 3.
29. See Greg Johnson, Striking Actors Unhappy over Shaq 's Disney Spot, L.A. TIMES, June
21, 2000, at Cl; Dave McNary, Trial Boards To Start, VARIETY, July 31-Aug. 6, 2000, at 6.
30. Armbrust, supra note 28 ("[A]s a SAG and AFTRA member, I fully support the strike
and hope that negotiations can resume in the very near future so both sides can get back to
business as quickly as possible.").
31. Todd Amorde, chairman of the unions' joint strike committee, was quoted as defending
the committee's decision to recommend no disciplinary action: "Shaq's feelings were hurt by this,
and that was never our intention," Amorde said. "It was, however, our intention to educate him to
the issues around the strike and what a SAG member's obligations are during a strike. He
understands that and is completely supportive of the strike and is not going to do any more struck
commercials." David Robb, "Shaq Still A Hero To Actors Unions," HOLLYWOOD REPORTER,
June 27, 2000, at 6.
32. McNary, supra note 23.
33. Vicki Grimshaw, Wendy's Chief Pitchman Bags Strike, N.Y. POST, Oct. 20, 2000, at 48;
Barnet D. Wolf, Thomas Back in New Ads for Wendy's, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 21, 2000, at
IF.
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changed his status with SAG from member to financial core dues payor,14
and citing concern for Wendy's shareholders and employees, Thomas then
filmed a commercial to promote Wendy's spicy chicken sandwich. 35
Although only celebrities who worked during the strike attracted
media attention, SAG is on the lookout for all "strikebreakers."3 6 One
survey approximated that 1,000 performers worked during the strike,
twenty percent of whom were SAG members.37 Although SAG initially
considered a lifetime ban on membership for non-union strikebreakers,
SAG is now considering a ban of three to seven years.38
III. SETTING THE STAGE: THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
A. Union Security Clauses May Require Employees To Join a Union
Until Congress passed the Wagner Act in 1935, 39 the precursor to the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 40 efforts to organize labor in the
United States were largely unprotected. Management was free to frustrate
employees' attempts to organize by threatening termination, an especially
powerful weapon during the depression when jobs were scarce. The
Wagner Act therefore focused on creating meaningful protection of
employees' rights to organize and bargain collectively, and not on
regulating unions' activities.4'
The Wagner Act explicitly approved of the so-called "closed shop,"
whereby unions and employers could agree that employees must first
belong to a union before obtaining a job.42 Specifically, section 8(a)(3) of
the Wagner Act stated, "nothing in this Act ... shall preclude an employer
from making an agreement with a labor organization ... to require [union
membership] as a condition of employment.5
4 3
34. Wolf, supra note 33.
35. Id.; Grimshaw, supra note 33.
36. McNary, SAG Reduces Sanctions, supra note 27, at 2.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69(1994).
41. 1 PATRICK HARDIN, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 29 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter 1
HARDIN].
42. Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 8(a)(3), 49 Stat. 452 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1994)). For the purpose of this Article, section 8 and section 158 are used
interchangeably in accordance with the customary practice of the National Labor Relations
Board, the courts, and practitioners.
43. Id.
2001]
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Critics of the Wagner Act viewed the legislation as one-sided, slanted
heavily in favor of organized labor. As a result, in 1947 Congress passed
the Taft-Hartley amendments, which focused, in part, on employees' rights
not to join a union, and outlawed the "closed shop." 44 Section 158(a)(3)
was amended to make it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discriminate in hiring in such a way as to encourage or discourage union
membership. An added proviso stated, "nothing in this Act... shall
preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor
organization... to require as a condition of employment membership
therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such
employment. '45 Thus, union security clauses requiring union membership
as a precondition of hire are illegal, but arrangements requiring union
membership after hire are not.46 The Taft-Hartley amendments also added
a proviso prohibiting employers from firing employees for not belonging to
a union, unless their non-membership resulted from failing to pay certain
union dues and initiation fees.47
In Radio Officers Union of the Commercial Telegraphers Union v.
NLRB,'48 the United States Supreme Court explained that the Taft-Hartley
amendments were intended to prevent union security clauses from being
used for any purpose other than to compel payment of basic union dues and
fees.49 Congress allowed union security clauses because unions had valid
concerns about "free riders," i.e., employees who would benefit from union
representation, but who were unwilling to financially support the union.
50
Union security clauses ensured that there would be no free riders. 1 On the
other hand, the Taft-Hartley amendments eliminated a union's power to
44. 1 HARDIN, supra note 41, 30-32, 40.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (emphasis added).
46. See id. Such arrangements create an employment situation known as a "union shop." 2
PATRICK HARDIN, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1495-96 (3d ed. 1992).
47. Currently, the second proviso of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA provides:
[N]o Employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for
nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for
believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same
terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has
reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for
reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the
initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
48. 347 U.S. 17 (1954), aff'g, 196 F.2d 960 (2d. Cir. 1952).
49. Id. at 41.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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require employers to fire non-union employees, as long as those employees
paid certain dues and fees.52
Both the current Producer-Screen Actors Guild Codified Basic
Agreement ("SAG Agreement") and the Writers Guild of America
Theatrical and Television Basic Agreement ("WGA Agreement") contain
union security clauses requiring employees to become union members after
obtaining employment. 3  Both agreements provide that employers do not
violate the union security provisions if they employ a non-member,
provided the reason for non-membership is not the employee's failure to
pay dues and fees. 54 Although a general perception exists that producers
will not hire non-union writers or actors,55 nothing in the WGA or SAG
agreements prohibits them from doing so. Indeed, it would be unlawful for
52. Seeid. at 40-41.
53. See PRODUCER-SCREEN ACTORS GUILD CODIFIED BASIC AGREEMENT OF 1995 § 2.A
(1995) [hereinafter SAG AGREEMENT]; WGA AGREEMENT, supra note 5, art. 6.A.
54. See SAG AGREEMENT, supra note 53, § 2.C. Section 2 further provides "[it is the
intention of the parties to prevent the Union from closing its books so as to prevent any person
who wishes to act in motion pictures from joining the Union." Id. § 2.G. Article 6, section H of
the WGA Agreement similarly states:
It is understood that the provisions of this Article 6 shall never under any
circumstances be so construed during the term of this Basic Agreement as to
constitute or permit what is known as a "closed shop" or construed in any manner
that will at any time deprive the Company of its right to employ or continue the
employment of a writer who is not a member of the Guild in good standing, or who
does not become a member of the Guild in good standing. within the period
prescribed in Paragraph A. of this Article 6 if the Company has reasonable grounds
for believing that such a membership was not available to such writer on the same
terms and conditions generally applicable to other like members of the Guild, or if
the Company has reasonable grounds for believing that membership in the Guild
was denied, deferred, suspended or terminated for reasons other than the failure of
such person to tender the applicable periodic dues uniformly required as a condition
for acquiring or retaining membership in the Guild.
55. See, e.g., Emily C. Chi, Star Quality and Job Security: The Role of the Performers'
Unions in Controlling Access to the Acting Profession, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 10-11
(2000) (positing that the Actors' Equity Association and Screen Actors Guild membership
requirements, producers' preference for hiring qualified performers, and union security clauses
contained in collective bargaining agreements, produce a de facto closed shop in the acting
profession); see also John Horn, Writers Sleuth To Uncover Strike Breakers, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, July 6, 1988, at C9 (reporting the WGA planned to expel members who worked during
the 1988 strike, "effectively ending a screenwriter's career").
In fact, the SAG Agreement states only that preference will be given to "qualified
professional performers," who are defined as individuals who have been employed as motion
picture performers at least once in the previous three years. SAG AGREEMENT, supra note 53, §
14.A. These individuals may be, but are not necessarily, SAG members. In addition, the SAG
Agreement provides various exceptions under which performers who have not yet been employed
on a motion picture may be hired for the first time. Id. § 14.D. There is no similar provision in
the WGA Agreement requiring producers to give preference to "professional," or previously
employed writers.
2001]
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an employer to refuse to hire a writer or performer because that person was
not yet a union member.
B. Unlike Regular Employees, Supervisors Are Not Subject to NLRA
Protections
Another significant change made by the 1947 Taft-Hartley
amendments was the exclusion of supervisors from the protections of the
NLRA, 56 as a result of which the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") does not regulate employer actions with respect to supervisors.
Therefore, an employer may prohibit its supervisors from joining a union.57
However, an employer may consent to include supervisors within the
coverage of a collective bargaining agreement, and may permit supervisors
to join a union. In such cases, a supervisor may have obligations to both
his employer and his union, especially during a strike.58
In the motion picture and television industry, the WGA Agreement
has historically covered some categories of supervisors and, consequently,
supervisors have joined the WGA.59 These supervisor-members, such as
executive producer-writers, story editor-writers and director-writers, are
known as hyphenates, because they perform both writing and supervisory
functions, including hiring writers and directing their work.6°
56. The NLRA defines supervisors as those
having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off,
recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or
responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such action, if ... such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical
nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1994).
57. See, e.g., Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 641, 417 U.S.
790, 812 (1974) (stating an employer "is at liberty to demand absolute loyalty from his
supervisory personnel by insisting, on pain of discharge, that they neither participate in, nor retain
membership in, a labor union").
58. "[I]nherent in the option afforded the employer by Congress [permitting supervisors to
become union members], must be the recognition that supervisors permitted by their employers to
maintain union membership will necessarily incur obligations to [both]." Id. at 812 n.22.
59. See WGA AGREEMENT, supra note 5, art. 14, § A ("The parties acknowledge that it is
customary in the television industry to employ persons to render services as writers under the
terms of this Basic Agreement, and the same persons to render services in other capacities which
are not subject to this Basic Agreement.").
60. See id.
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IV. UNION MEMBERSHIP: THE UNION MEMBER'S RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS
A. Financial Core: The Paying Non-Member
Pursuant to Taft-Hartley, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court in Communication Workers of America v. Beck,6' a union member
may assume financial core status by resigning from union membership, but
continuing to pay a portion of the union's initiation fees and dues.62 The
fees and dues paid must be sufficient to compensate the union for its
collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment
efforts on that worker's behalf.
63
Historically, union members have assumed financial core status for a
variety of reasons. For example, some members objected to paying dues
used for a union's political or other activities,6 4 while others contended
membership violated their religious beliefs.6 5 Political commentators have
also objected to union membership based on First Amendment
considerations.66 Most significant to this Article, the financial core issue
has also arisen during strikes, when members have disagreed with their
61. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
62. See id. at 745 (citing NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963), rev'g,
303 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1962)).
63. Id.
64. For example, one article discussing the concept of financial core status reports that a
former SAG board member, Mark McIntire, became a financial core dues payor in the 1980s,
apparently as a result of a long-standing disagreement over the direction of SAG activities.
Sobel, supra note 4, at 3; see also Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768-69
(1961) (under the Railway Labor Act, unions are not permitted to spend on political causes the
compulsory dues and fees of non-members who object), rev'g, 108 S.E.2d 796 (Ga. 1959); Beck,
487 U.S. at 745 (expanding the holding of Street to the National Labor Relations Act and holding
that unions may use mandatory dues and fees of financial core members only to perform the
duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-
management issues).
65. E.g., McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 571 F.2d 338, 343 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding union
security provisions do not relieve employer of duty under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
reasonably accommodate religious beliefs of employees), rev'g, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
807 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 13, 1976).
66. See Buckley v. Am. Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305, 308-09, 311
(2d Cir. 1974) (rejecting the argument that political commentators, including William F. Buckley,
Jr., have a First Amendment right not to belong to a union or to pay even financial core dues and
fees: "The dues here are not flat fees imposed directly on the exercise of a federal right.... To
the contrary, assuming, arguendo, that government action is involved here, the dues more
logically would constitute the employee's share of the expenses of operating a valid labor
regulatory system which serves a substantial public purpose.").
2001]
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union's stance during negotiations,67 when members wanted to return to
work,68 or when they simply wanted to make a point.69
1. "Membership": A Misleading Term of Art
Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA allows employers to make agreements
with unions requiring employees to become union members, yet
simultaneously prohibits employers from encouraging union membership. v
The United States Supreme Court reconciled this seeming contradiction by
interpreting the term "membership" to mean solely the obligation to pay
those initiation fees and dues necessary for the union to perform its duties
as the employee's exclusive representative in dealing with the employer.7 '
However, even after the Supreme Court in General Motors and Beck
assigned a legal meaning to the term "membership," union members
continued to challenge union security clauses that did not define the
parameters of the term within the union security clause itself.
72
The Court put the issue to rest in Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild,
Inc.7 3  In Marquez, the Court unanimously decided that a union may
enforce a collective bargaining agreement requiring union "membership"
67. See James Bates, Writers Strike Has L.A. 's Hyphenates' Getting Very Itchy, S.F.
CHRON., July 20, 1988, at E6 (discussing dissatisfaction of some writers during 1988 writers'
strike over WGA's position in negotiations and those writers' threats to assume financial core
status).
68. See id.
69. See Judith Michaelson, Herschensohn Walkout Angers Unions, L.A. TIMES, July 11,
1988, at Calendar, at 1. KABC-TV commentator Bruce Herschensohn resigned from AFTRA in
1988 to show striking WGA members "how to do it and that you can do it." Id. (quoting Bruce
Herschensohn).
70. See discussion supra Part III.A.
71. See General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. at 742 ("Under the second proviso to § 8(a)(3), the
burdens of membership upon which employment may be conditioned are expressly limited to the
payment of initiation fees and monthly dues. It is permissible to condition employment upon
membership, but membership, insofar as it has significance to employment rights, may in turn be
conditioned only upon payment of fees and dues. 'Membership' as a condition of employment is
whittled down to its financial core."); Beck, 487 U.S. at 762-63 (stating section 8(a)(3)
"authorizes the exaction of only those fees and dues necessary to 'performing the duties of an
exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management
issues').
72. See, e.g., Int'l Union of Elec., Elec., Salaried, Mach. and Furniture Workers v. NLRB,
41 F.3d 1532, 1537-38 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (refusing to enforce NLRB's ruling that the union acted
in bad faith by maintaining union security clause without informing members of their rights to
become financial core dues payors); Nielsen v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
94 F.3d 1107, 1115-16 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding agency shop clause not facially invalid for failing
to include notice of right to challenge fees charged for exclusive representation, at least where
union newsletter contained such notice), affg, 895 F. Supp. 1093 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
73. 525 U.S. 33 (1998), aft'g, 124 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 1997).
BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE
as a condition of employment, and that use of the language of the NLRA,
without including a definition of the term "membership" in the collective
bargaining agreement, did not violate the union's duty of fair representation
to members of the bargaining unit.
74
In Marquez, the plaintiff was a part-time actress selected for a role in
an episode of a television series. 75 The production company was a party to
the SAG agreement, which included a union security clause requiring
performers who worked more than thirty days in the motion picture
industry to become "a member of the Union in good standing., 76 Because
Marquez had worked more than thirty days in the industry, she was
required to pay union dues and fees of approximately $500 before she
could perform in the episode.77 Marquez attempted to make arrangements
with SAG allowing her to pay the fees after she was paid for her work.78
However, she was unsuccessful, and another actress was ultimately hired
for the part.79
In Marquez, the Court addressed the narrow question of whether a
union breaches its duty of fair representation by negotiating a union-
security clause that tracks the precise language of section 8(a)(3), without
explaining in the agreement the meaning of that language as set forth in
General Motors and Beck.80 The Court concluded:
[B]y tracking the statutory language, the clause incorporates all
of the refinements that have become associated with that
language .... To the extent that these interpretations are not
obvious, the relevant provisions of §8(a)(3) have become terms
of art; the words and phrasing of the subsection now encompass
the rights that we announced in General Motors and Beck.8'
74. Id. at 46-47. The Supreme Court did not decide whether SAG illegally enforced the
union security clause by allegedly requiring Marquez to become a member or to require her to
pay dues for non-collective bargaining activities. Id. at 42. Another issue not before the Court
was whether SAG breached its duty of fair representation by failing to adequately notify Marquez
of her rights under Beck and General Motors by means other than the collective bargaining
agreement itself. Id. at 43. The Board has held, and SAG conceded, that unions have an
obligation to so notify employees. Id.; see also discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
75. Marquez, 525 U.S. at 39.
76. Id. at 38 (citing the collective bargaining agreement).
77. Id. at 39.
78. Id.
79. Id. After a new actress was hired, SAG faxed a letter to the production company stating
it had no objection to Marquez working in the production, but the letter was too late, and the
production company proceeded on schedule with the replacement actress. Id.
80. Id. at 42, 45.
81. Marquez, 525 U.S. at 46.
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The Marquez decision validates using the term "membership" as a
term of art in a collective bargaining agreement, even though such
language admittedly does not mean what it says. 82 Were union members
required to rely solely on the collective bargaining agreement for an
explanation of their membership obligations, uninformed members could
be misled. However, even before Marquez, the Board had held that unions
must notify all unit employees in a reasonable manner of their rights under
General Motors to become financial core dues payors, and of their rights
under Beck to pay only for union activities germane to collective
bargaining and administration of the contract.8 3 Unions failing to provide
members with adequate notice of their General Motors and Beck rights
through periodic newsletters or other publications may be in violation of
section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA, which prohibits union restraint or
coercion of employee rights.84
2. The Well Kept Secret: What Employers Cannot Say About Financial
Core
Although unions have an affirmative duty to inform members of their
right to assume financial core status, the NLRA imposes restraints on an
employer's ability to do the same. Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for
an employer to pressure or coerce any employee in the exercise of the
employee's rights under § 7 of the NLRA which includes pressure or
coercion regarding the right to elect financial core status. As such, the
NLRB would likely find that an employer has applied unlawful pressure if
the employer were to spontaneously raise the subject of financial core.
For example, in Naperville Ready Mix, Inc. and General Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Salesdrivers and Helpers Local Union No. 673,86 one of the
82. Id. After Marquez, the Board has continued to allow union security clauses to require
"membership in good standing" language. E.g., Polymark Corp. and Int'l Union of Elec., Elec.,
Salaried, Mach. and Furniture, 329 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 1999-2000 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 15,257.
(Sept. 1, 1999), aff'g, 1995 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 996 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 30, 1992); Teamsters Local 75,
329 N.L.R.B. No. 12, 1999-2000 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 15,259. (Sept. 1, 1999), aJg, 1992
N.L.R.B. LEXIS 1051 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 4, 1992).
83. See Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224, 233 (1995), affg, 1992 N.L.R.B. LEXIS
669 (N.L.R.B. May 29, 1992), enforced, 133 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998).
84. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 75, 329 N.L.R.B. No. 12, 1999-2000 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
15,259 (holding the union violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA by failing to provide notice to
new employees of Beck and General Motors Rights, prior to obligating them to pay dues under
the union security clause).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994) In general, an employee's section 7 rights include the right to
join, or refrain from joining, a labor organization. Id.
86. 329 N.L.R.B. No 19, [1999-2000] NLRB Dec. (CCH) 15,277 (Sept. 21, 1999), affg,
1995 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 996 (N.L.R.B. Oct. 13, 1995).
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company's owners approached striking employees on the picket line, and
advised them to sign "financial core" statements, assume financial core
status, and then cross the picket line. 87 Otherwise, they were told, there
would be no work for them.88 The employer also distributed forms
outlining procedures for assuming financial core status just prior to
commencement of the strike. The NLRB held that this conduct violated
section 8(a)(1) 89 of the NLRA:
[The employer] had distributed forms outlining procedures for
becoming "financial core" members to the employees with the
paychecks that covered their work for the period ending with the
commencement of the strike. In the context in which this
occurred-the Respondent's imminent shift to an operation in
which it would be engaging employees' services only outside
the collective-bargaining relationship-Wehrli's conduct was
not a mere lawful response to employee questions about
resignation but amounted to unlawful solicitation of union
resignations, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.90
An employer may, however, give purely factual information
regarding an employee's right to assume financial core status in direct
response to employee inquiries. For example, in Lear Siegler, Inc.,9 1 the
employer responded to employees' inquiries regarding resignation by
87. Id. at 28,279.
88. See id.
89. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994) (stating it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to
"interfere with, restrain or coerce [an] employee[] in the exercise the rights guaranteed in Section
157 of this title").
90. Naperville Ready Mix, 329 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 1999-2000 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 15,276,
at 28,279; see also Gondorf Field, Black & Co. v. NLRB, 107 F.3d 882, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(upholding the Board's decision that the employer violated section 8(a)(1) by helping striking
workers resign from the union where supervisor prepared and distributed the resignation form,
waited for and obtained the signatures of several employees, completed and dated the form and
forwarded it to the union), ajfg, 318 N.L.R.B. 996 (1995); Schenk Packing Co., 301 N.L.R.B.
487, 489 (1991) (stating employees could reasonably perceive a substantial employment risk
should they fail to resign from the union where the employer stated that it would only consider
unit employees as replacements during a lockout once they resigned from the union); Chicago
Beef Co., 298 N.L.R.B. 1039, 1039 (1990) (stating it was not the dissemination of resignation
forms which violated the Act, but rather, the further act of conditioning reinstatement on
resignation from the union which constituted an unfair labor practice); Manhattan Eye, Ear and
Throat Hosp., 280 N.L.R.B. 113, 114 (1986) ("[A]n employer does not violate the Act merely by
providing employees with information on how to resign from the union 'as long as the employer
makes no attempt to ascertain whether employees will avail themselves of this right nor offers
any assistance, or otherwise creates a situation where employees would tend to feel peril in
refraining from such revocation," but repeatedly informing striking employees that they can
return to work once they resign from the union constitutes unlawful solicitation of union
resignation.).
91. 283 N.L.R.B. 929 (1987).
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providing verbal information and distributing and posting a notice
explaining employees' rights.92 The communications included a statement
that employees had a right under the NLRA to strike or refrain from doing
so, and that an employee could resign from the union to avoid possible
union fines for crossing a picket line.93 The information provided by the
employer emphasized that the decision to resign rested solely with the
employee.94  The Administrative Law Judge ("AL") found these
communications were not calculated to interfere with the employees'
section 7 rights and did not violate the NLRA.95
In Laundry, Dry Cleaning, Government and Industrial Service, Local
3,96 in the context of evaluating an unfair labor practice charge against a
union for refusing to accept employees' resignations, the Board found that
there was no coercion in either the employer's memoranda to employees
regarding strike rights, or in the employer's provision of resignation
exemplars. 97 One memorandum advised employees that if they decided to
work during the threatened strike, they would be vulnerable to disciplinary
fines by the union as long as they retained union membership. 98 Another
memorandum stated:
This letter is intended to make you aware of your rights. We
recognize that it is your individual right to make your own
decision without your employer or your Union attempting to tell
you what to do. We are not urging you either to remain a
member of the Union or to resign from the Union. 99
In addition to this memorandum, the employer provided employees
with samples of resignation letters they could send to the union to terminate
union membership, thus immunizing employees from union discipline. 00
Although the ALJ specifically noted that he was not reviewing the validity
of the employer's communications, he found that the memoranda had not
coerced employees into resigning. 01  Therefore, by implication, it is
unlikely that such communications would violate section 8(a)(1).
92. Id. at 943-44.
93. Id. at 944.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 946.
96. 275 N.L.R.B. 697 (1985).
97. Id. at 704.
98. Id. at 699.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 704.
BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE
Notwithstanding the foregoing decisions, there is a risk that even
factual information provided in response to an employee's specific request
might be perceived by the NLRB as unlawful pressure or coercion.
Because of this risk, many employers prefer to give employees only
general information, and direct employee inquiries to an independent
attorney or to the local office of the NLRB. As a result, union members
must generally rely on their unions to inform them of their rights regarding
financial core status.
3. Why Financial Core?
The primary benefit of assuming financial core status is not financial,
in that financial core dues payors must continue to pay most of the union's
customary dues and fees. 10 2 Instead, the significance is that, unlike union
members, financial core dues payors are not subject to union discipline,
even if they work during a strike. 10 3 Although financial core dues payors
are not bound by the union's rules, they are covered by the terms and
conditions of the collective bargaining agreement, cannot be
discriminatorily denied benefits guaranteed under the collective bargaining
agreement, such as pension and health benefits, 10 4 and are owed by the
union the same duty of fair representation as full members. 10 5  In short,
financial core dues payors reap the benefits of what they pay for: the
union's efforts in collective bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance adjustment.
102. See Beck., 487 U.S. at 745. The authors do not know what percentage of the full dues
is required by SAG or the WGA. But see Screen Actors Guild, No. 31-CB-8059, 1990 WL
597041, *1-2 (N.L.R.B. Op. Off. Gen. Counsel, Aug. 20, 1990) (SAG violated section 8(b)(1)(A)
of NLRA by requiring financial core member to pay 95.68 percent of normal union dues, because
inclusion in dues of cost of lobbying for collective bargaining legislation and "operating and
administrative costs" such as rent, utilities, salaries and travel, were not properly chargeable to
financial core member.).
103. See supra note 20. Union members, on the other hand, are subject to the union's
constitution and rules. SAG CONST., supra note 3, art. XIV, § 3 (c); WGA CONST., supra note 3,
art. X, pt. A § 1.
104. See, e.g., Teamsters Cannery Local 670 v. NLRB, 856 F.2d 1250, 1256 (9th Cir. 1988)
(ruling in the context of interpreting a strike settlement agreement, financial core members cannot
be denied access to pharmacy and clinics in retaliation for electing financial core status during a
strike); Graphic Communications Int'l Union, Photoengravers Pension Welfare Fund, Nos. 30-
CA-9669, 30-CB-2612, 1988 WL 236535, *2 (N.L.R.B. Op. Off. Gen. Counsel, Sept. 30, 1988)
(stating that an employer cannot discriminate against financial core members by denying health
and pension benefits).
105. See, e.g., Kidwell v. Transp. Communications Int'l Union, 946 F.2d 283, 297 (4th Cir.
1991) ("The employee, regardless of union membership, has the right [under the NLRA and
RLA] to be represented fairly and heard by the collective bargaining representative.").
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However, financial core dues payors lose many of the privileges of
union membership. The union may prohibit financial core dues payors
from voting to ratify a collective bargaining agreement, voting in union
elections, running for union offices or attending union meetings.10 6  To
some, these benefits are important because they are essentially the only
means by which an individual bargaining unit employee can voice an
opinion on specific issues of collective bargaining, or on the political
direction of the union. In addition, in the motion picture and television
industry, a union member who assumes financial core status during a strike
may face ostracism by union members, 10 7 despite purported protection
against discrimination.1
08
4. When To Go Financial Core? Timing Is Everything
In NLRB v. Textile Workers Union,10 9 the Supreme Court held that a
union violated the NLRA when it sued to collect strike-related fines
imposed on former members who assumed financial core status before
crossing a picket line. The Court reached this result even though the union
members voted in favor of the strike, and then resigned after the strike was
declared. 110 The Court determined that once a member resigns or elects
106. See General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. at 737.
107. See, e.g., Michael Cieply, Emotions Run High over Writers' Split: Dissidents' Back-
to-Work Threat Provokes Bitter Response, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 1988, at 1. During the 1988
WGA strike, some members threatened to become financial core dues payors in protest of the
WGA's failure to agree to a contract that many members supported. Id. The union did not
appreciate the threat, and some questioned the members' motives for wanting to obtain financial
core status. Id. See also Letter to the Editor from Edmund H. North, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 1988,
at Calendar, at 2 (reminding potential union deserters of the 1936 effort of some dissidents to
resign and form their own union: "The ensuring [sic] years [when the dissidents returned to the
WGA] were traumatic for these people [because] [f]riendships had dissolved [and] [s]ocial
contacts had dried up. There were no welcoming smiles at the writers' table in the studio
commissary. Desertion in the face of the enemy has always carried a heavy penalty."); Michael
Cieply, Emotions Run High over Writers' Split: Dissidents' Back-to-Work Threat Provokes
Bitter Response, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 1988, at 1 (quoting striking guild members regarding threat
of some members to resign and return to work; "For all that the guild has done for them, they just
turned [without recognizing any] sense of history.").
Also, at a meeting to ratify the 1988 WGA Agreement, some union members distributed
lists of the names of dissenting members, and a WGA board member attempted to list their names
from the podium, with encouragement from the majority of the membership. Letter to the Editor
from Eugenie Ross-Leming, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1988, at Calendar, at 103; Letter to the Editor
from Mark Evanier, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1988, at Calendar, at 99.
108. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hershey Foods Corp., 513 F.2d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating
that an employee may not be discharged, nor may a union demand the employer discharge the
employee, because the employee has assumed financial core status).
109. 409 U.S. 213 (1972), rev'g, 446 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971).
110. Id. at 214.
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financial core status, "the union has no more control over the former
member than it has over the man in the street.' 11
Unions cannot circumvent the rule promulgated in Textile Workers
Union by attempting to control the timing of a member's resignation. In
Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, l12 the Supreme Court considered a
provision of a union's constitution prohibiting members from resigning
during a strike." 13 A divided Court held that the union violated the NLRA
by fining former members who resigned before returning to work, despite
the union's rules prohibiting resignations during a strike. 1 4 In holding that
a union may not prohibit resignation during a strike, the Court explained
that the NLRA "protects the employment rights of the dissatisfied member,
as well as those of the worker who never assumed full union
membership."" 15 The Court reasoned, "[b]y allowing employees to resign
from a union at any time, § 8(a)(3) protects the employee whose views
come to diverge from those of his union."''
6
Despite the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Pattern Makers, the
WGA Constitution in effect during the 1988 WGA strike contained a
provision prohibiting resignation during a strike." 7 This provision was the
111. Id. at 217.
112. 473 U.S. 95 (1985), aff'g, 724 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1983).
113. Id. at 97.
114. Id. at 115-16.
115. Id. at 106.
116. Id. However, a union is well within its rights to discipline a member who first crosses
a picket line or works in a non-union production and then chooses financial core status. For a
recent example see, Mike Salinas, Williams Tries Equity Dodge, BACK STAGE, Oct. 6, 2000, at 1
(discussing the attempt of actor Barry Williams, Greg Brady from "The Brady Bunch," to escape
union discipline by Actors' Equity for performing in non-union production of "The Sound of
Music" by choosing financial core status after he agreed to play the part of Captain Von Trapp).
117. Section 8 (Resignation) of the WGA Constitution in effect in 1988 provided:
By accepting membership in the Guild members agree that the continuation of
membership status and the applicability of discipline to all members, especially
during times of negotiation with employers or during strikes by the Guild, is
essential to their welfare and necessary for solidarity and to achieve the objectives
of the Guild, and that resignation during or shortly preceding a strike by the Guild
shall not relieve a member of his obligations during the duration of such and related
strikes to observe the Guild's strike rules ....
(c) If a member tenders his resignation after commencement of collective
bargaining between the Guild and one or more employers, and within twenty-one
(21) days prior to the expiration date of the then current and applicable collective
bargaining agreement, and if a strike occurs within twenty-one (21) days of the
expiration of said collective bargaining agreements, or if a member tenders his
resignation during a strike ... his resignation shall not relieve the member of his
obligation to observe the Guild strike rules and a primary picket line of the Guild
for the duration of such and related strikes, and such member shall remain subject
to Article X (Discipline) for the duration of such and related strikes.
WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS art. IV, § 8 (Oct. 1980).
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subject of an unfair labor practice charge filed by twenty-one members of
the WGA and the Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers
(,,AMPTP").118 In Writers Guild ofAmerica, West, Inc., the NLRB ordered
the WGA to expunge the unlawful provisions from its Constitution. 1'9
Currently, neither the WGA nor the SAG Constitutions prohibit resignation
during a strike. 2°
B. Wearing Two Hats: The Hyphenate As Supervisor and Union Member
"A supervisor-member cannot serve both masters without
incurring some obligations to both; it is simply unfair to require
unions to accept members who receive all of the benefits of the
association and bear none of the obligations. ,121
Employers may demand absolute loyalty from their supervisors, and
may prohibit them from belonging to a union. 22 This right is critical to
employers who, during a labor strike, rely upon their supervisors to
perform not only their regular supervisory duties, but sometimes the rank-
118. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., 297 N.L.R.B. 92 (1989). The AMPTP is a
multi-employer bargaining association which represents various employers engaged in the
business of producing theatrical and television motion pictures in connection with their collective
bargaining negotiations with various unions and guilds. Id.
119. Id. at 94.
120. WGA CONST., supra note 3, art. IV, pt. F; SAG CONST., supra note 3, art. IV, § 4.
Each of the guilds has its own procedures regarding how to "resign" (or elect financial core
status). The WGA requires a resignation in writing, signed by the member, and personally
delivered to and "receipted by" an officer or employee of the Guild, or mailed by certified or
registered mail to the Board of Directors. WGA CONST., supra note 3, art. IV, pt. F.
The SAG Constitution requires a General Member to give written notice by mail or
delivery to the Hollywood office, and a Branch Member to mail or deliver notice to the member's
Branch office. SAG CONST., supra note 3, art. IV, § 4.
Notwithstanding the WGA's and SAG's instructions on how to resign, a union member's
resignation or election of financial core status becomes effective when the member clearly
manifests his or her intent to resign or elect financial core status. See, e.g., Peabody Coal Co.,
291 N.L.R.B. 361, 363 (1988) ("An employee's resignation from membership in a labor
organization may be communicated orally or in writing and need only convey a clear intention to
resign.").
121. NLRB v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 340, 481 U.S. 573, 593 (1987), affig, 780
F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1986).
122. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1994) ("Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed
as a supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer
subject to this subchapter shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as
employees for the purpose of any law ... relating to collective bargaining."); Fla. Power & Light
Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 417 U.S. 790, 812 (1974) (stating that an employer "is at
liberty to demand absolute loyalty from his supervisory personnel by insisting, on pain of
discharge, that they neither participate in, nor retain membership in, a labor union").
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and-file work normally performed by striking workers. 123 Supervisors, in
large part, enable employers to continue operating during a strike.
However, employers and unions occasionally agree that supervisors
will be represented by, and allowed to join, a union.1 24 In any industry,
when supervisors are also union members, tensions often arise during a
strike because the supervisor-member may have divided loyalties between
his employer and his union. While employers may order supervisors to
cross picket lines during a strike, a union may lawfully discipline
supervisor-members for performing the rank-and-file work of striking
employees, 25 as well as certain kinds of supervisory work.
26
However, section 8(b)(1)(B) of the NLRA imposes some limits upon
a union's ability to discipline a supervisor-member for crossing a picket
line. Section 8(b)(1)(B) provides that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce ... an employer
in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective
bargaining or the adjustment of grievances.' 27 Therefore, if a supervisor-
member's regular job duties include tasks related to collective bargaining
or grievance adjustment, a union may not prevent the supervisor-member
from performing those duties during a strike by threatening or imposing
discipline. 128
In the motion picture and television industry, there is a unique group
of supervisor-members called hyphenates. 29 These individuals are writer
members of the WGA and perform supervisorial tasks for their producer-
employers. Hyphenates include executive producer-writers, producer-
writers, associate producer-writers and story editor-writers. 30  As is
discussed in Section IV.B. 1, the Supreme Court, in American Broadcasting
Cos. v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc.,131 recognized that these
categories of hyphenates performed section 8(B)(1)(b) duties, at least under
the facts of that case. 132  However, the determination of whether a
particular hyphenate performs job duties related to collective bargaining or
123. See Fla. Power & Light Co., 417 U.S. at 796.
124. See, e.g., id. at 793-94.
125. Id. at 813.
126. See Int'7 Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 481 U.S. 573.
127. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1994).
128. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Writers Guild of Am., West, Inc., 437 U.S. 411, 424 (1978), revg
547 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1976)..
129. Id. at 411.
130. See WGA AGREEMENT, supra note 5, art. 14, § A.
131. 437 U.S. 411.
132. Id. at 412.
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grievance adjustment must be made on a case-by-case basis, depending on
the hyphenate's actual job duties.
13 3
1. The Unique Dilemma of Hyphenates During a Strike: American
Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild ofAmerica, West, Inc.
American Broadcasting Cos. illustrates the hyphenate's dilemma
during a strike. In March 1973, the WGA engaged in a strike against the
network and producer members of the AMPTP.134 Before the strike, the
WGA distributed strike rules to all of its members, including hyphenates.
1 35
Among other mandates, the strike rules prohibited members from
working for a struck producer, required each member to accept picket duty
when assigned, prohibited members from resigning from the union during
the strike, 136 and prohibited members from ever working with any
individual who violated any of the union's strike rules. 137 Certain of the
hyphenates who received the WGA's strike rules customarily performed
supervisory functions including hiring and directing the work of writers. In
addition, the hyphenates performed certain limited writing duties not
covered by the collective bargaining agreement, as well as covered work. 1
38
In connection with their primary supervisory duties, many hyphenates
were represented by labor organizations other than the WGA, such as the
Directors Guild of America.' 39  Some of the organizations' contracts
contained no-strike clauses, and therefore, those organizations instructed
hyphenates to disregard the strike and report to work.140 In addition, some
of the hyphenates had personal services contracts with their producer-
employers, and were instructed by their employers that they were expected
to fulfill their obligations under those contracts during the strike.' 4' The
hyphenates were assured, however, that they would not be asked to perform
any writing duties covered by the collective bargaining agreement. 142
133. See, e.g., id.
134. Id. at 414.
135. Id. at 415. The specific hyphenates involved were executive producers, producers,
associate producers, directors, story editors, story consultants, script consultants, executive story
editors, and executive story consultants. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 957,
961 (1975).
136. Am. Broad. Cos., 437 U.S. at 415.
137. Id. at 416.
138. Id. at 417.
139. See id. at 415.
140. Id.
141. Writers Guild of Am., West, 217 N.L.R.B. at 968.
142. Am. Broad. Cos., 437 U.S. at 417. The reported Board and court decisions do not
discuss why the producer-employers expressly exempted rank-and-file writing duties from those
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The WGA charged those who returned to work with violating strike
rules, and disciplinary hearings ensued. At the hearings, the hyphenates
were found guilty of violating strike rules. 143  The WGA imposed
discipline, including expulsion, suspension and fines up to $50,000.144
The AMPTP and the networks then filed unfair labor practice charges,
asserting that the WGA violated section 8(b)(1)(B) of the NLRA. 145  The
ALJ ultimately recommended the charges be sustained. 146 The ALJ found
that the various categories of producers, directors and story editors were
supervisors within the meaning of the NLRA, and that these hyphenates
had the authority and the obligation to adjust grievances.
147
Specifically, the ALJ found that the producers adjusted grievances
between directors and craft employees, directors and actors, between two
or more actors, and in matters involving writers, as in the case of disputes
between writers and story editors. 148 The ALJ found that directors adjusted
grievances among the crew and actors. 149 Finally, the ALJ found that on a
television series, the story editor may participate with the producer in the
initial determination of a dispute over screen credits. The story editor also
may serve as a buffer between management and the writer, as in
ameliorating a writer's distress over rewritten material. 50
tasks that they asked hyphenates to perform. It is possible, however, that the employers were
attempting to protect hyphenates from union discipline by bolstering the argument that the work
performed during the strike was simply normal supervisory work that fell within the parameters
of section 8(b)(1)(B). During the board hearings in American Broadcasting Cos., the Supreme
Court issued its opinion in Florida Power & Light Co., holding that a union may lawfully
discipline a supervisor-member for crossing a picket line to perform rank and file struck work.
417 U.S. at 790.
143. Id. at 417-18.
144. Id. at 418. The penalties received wide publicity and were drastically reduced after
appeals. Id. at 418 & n.7.
145. Am. Broad. Cos., 437 U.S. at 418.
146. Id. at 419-22.
147. Id. at 426-27 n.25; see also Writers Guild of Am., West, 217 N.L.R.B. at 960-62.
148. Am. Broad. Cos., 437 U.S. at 419-22. For example, in one instance in which a dispute
arose as to whether a commitment was made to a freelance writer, the producer involved decided
that no commitment was made. Writers Guild of Am., West, Inc. 217 N.L.R.B. at 970. The
testimony showed that if the producer had decided a commitment had been made, that would
have been binding and resolved the dispute. Id. In situations in which the film is being shot on a
distant location, the producer may be involved in negotiating or agreeing to short-term
agreements with local unions where the services of local craft members are required, and possibly
adjusting, or attempting to adjust, local jurisdictional conflicts. Id.
149. Am. Broad. Cos., 437 U.S. at 419-20 & n.8.
150. Id. at 419-20 n.8. One executive story editor testified that because he was the first
person in the studio the writer met, and due to the story editor's close association with the writer,
"if [the writer] has a problem, more likely than not, he will come to me because it is usually a
problem with a producer, or things aren't working out." Id.
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The ALJ concluded that by issuing strike rules and engaging in other
conduct designed to compel the hyphenates to refrain from working, such
as threatening permanent blacklisting by other writers, the WGA restrained
and coerced the hyphenates from engaging in supervisory services for their
employer during the strike.15' Such restraints and coercion restricted
employers in the selection of their section 8(b)(1)(B) representatives.152 On
appeal, the NLRB adopted the conclusions of the ALJ.153  The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, denied enforcement of the
NLRB's order.
154
In a five to four decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the Court of Appeals. 55 The Court rejected the Second Circuit's ruling that
it is never an unfair labor practice for a union to discipline a supervisor-
member for working during a strike, regardless of the type of work
performed. 56  The Supreme Court reviewed its prior opinion in Florida
Power & Light, in which it found that a "carry-over" effect could occur if a
union were allowed to discipline a supervisor-member without
consideration of the kind of work the supervisor performed. 57 The Court
ruled that a union's discipline of a supervisor-member would violate
section 8(b)(1)(B) whenever such discipline could adversely affect the
supervisor's future conduct in his capacity as a grievance adjuster.
158
Therefore, the Court concluded that "[i]n ruling upon a Section 8(b)(1)(B)
charge growing out of union discipline of a supervisory member who elects
151. Id. at 421.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 421-22.
154. Id. at 422. In a brief per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals denied enforcement and
agreed with dissenting Board member, Fanning, that Florida Power & Light barred the results
reached by the Board. Writers Guild of Am., West, 217 N.L.R.B. at 966-71. Member Fanning
explained that the Supreme Court, in Florida Power & Light, "indicated that section 8(b)(1)(B)
was designed for the sole and limited purposes of preventing labor organizations from forcing
employers into multi-employer bargaining negotiations and from dictating to employers whom
they should select to represent them during grievance adjustment and/or collective-bargaining
sessions." Id. at 958. Member Fanning found, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the union's
actions did not violate these narrow purposes of section 8(b)(l)(B). Id.
155. Am. Broad. Cos., 437 U.S. at 438.
156. Id. at 429. The Court rejected the union's arguments that: 1) there was insufficient
evidence that any hyphenates were restrained from reporting to work; 2) discipline imposed on
the hyphenates who did report to work would not adversely affect the performance of their
grievance-adjustment duties; and 3) union discipline could not adversely affect a supervisor's
later performance of his section 8(b)(1)(B) duties, because the employer could require him to
leave the union and thereby free himself from further threats of union discipline. Id. at 431-32,
436. The Court found the third argument to be particularly weak, because at the time, the union
had a rule prohibiting members from resigning during a strike. Id. at 436-37.
157. Id. at 437.
158. Id. at 429-30.
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to work during a strike, [the NLRB] may-indeed it must-inquire whether
the sanction may 'adversely affect the supervisor's performance of his
collective bargaining or grievance adjustment tasks."
59
The Court in American Broadcasting Cos. focused on the effect of
union discipline on a supervisor-member's future performance of his
collective bargaining or grievance adjustment duties, rather than on the
duties the supervisor actually performed for his employer.' 60 As set forth in
Section IV.B.2, the Supreme Court later narrowed the 8(b)(1)(B) inquiry,
setting forth a test that required analysis of whether the supervisor-member
was currently involved in any collective bargaining or grievance
adjustment duties. 161
2. NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 340:
The Court Narrows the Parameters of Section 8(b)(1)(B)
In NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local
340,162 the Supreme Court narrowed its prior decisions, concluding that the
protections of section 8(b)(1)(B) are limited to certain types of
supervisors.'1 63 In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local
340, the union fined two supervisor-members for working for employers
who did not yet have collective bargaining agreements with the union.
164
The ALJ and the NLRB concluded that the union violated section
8(b)(1)(B) because the supervisors were part of the "reservoir" of
employees from which employers could select future representatives for
collective bargaining or grievance adjustment, regardless of whether these
supervisors currently performed such duties. 165 In the alternative, the ALJ
concluded that aside from the "reservoir doctrine," one of the supervisors
actually was an 8(b)(1)(B) supervisor, because, at that time, he granted
employees time off and resolved personal complaints or problems
regarding job assignments. 1
66
159. Id. at 430.
160. Id.
161. See Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 481 U.S. 573 (1987); see also discussion infra Part
IV.B.2.
162. 481 U.S. 573 (1987).
163. See id. at 595.
164. Id. at 573.
165. Id. at 577-78.
166. Id. at 577. The ALJ also concluded it was irrelevant that the union did not have a
collective bargaining agreement with the complaining employer, because discipline could still
have the effect of forcing the representatives to quit, thereby depriving the employer of his
services. Moreover and in any event, the ALJ found the union was seeking to represent the
employees. Id. at 577.
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected the "reservoir doctrine,"
holding that union discipline of a supervisor member only violates section
8(b)(1)(B) if the member is actually engaged in collective bargaining,
grievance adjustment, or a closely related activity, such as contract
interpretation.167 The Court did not address the Court of Appeals' alternate
holding that one of the supervisors was, in fact, a grievance adjuster.
However, the Court observed that the adjustment of personal, as opposed to
contractual grievances, may not qualify a supervisor as a section 8(b)(1)(B)
representative, because the language of the NLRA suggests that "grievance
adjustment" and "collective bargaining" have narrow meanings within the
context of section 8(b)(1)(B).1
68
In reaching this result, the Court found its holding consistent with
American Broadcasting Cos., because there, the Court had found that the
supervisor-members were actually engaged in section 8(b)(1)(B) duties.
169
However, the Court disavowed dictum from American Broadcasting Cos.,
in which the Court suggested that a union could not lawfully discipline a
supervisor when the supervisor engaged in supervisory tasks other than
those enumerated in section 8(b)(1)(B).1
7 0
Courts continue to narrowly interpret section 8(b)(1)(B). For
instance, in NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers Ass'n Local 104,171 the Ninth
Circuit denied enforcement of a Board order that found a violation of
section 8(b)(1)(B) when a union disciplined a supervisor-member for
assigning employees to work sites, and taking other supervisory actions
that allegedly conflicted with the collective bargaining agreement.172 The
NLRB characterized the supervisor-members' actions as "contract
interpretation," which was so closely related to collective bargaining that
the supervisor-members were immune from union discipline. 73 The Ninth
Circuit disagreed, holding:
We cannot read [International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers] as endorsing in any manner the Board's view that [the
supervisor-member's] daily supervisory activities, carried out in
conformity with and by reference to the collective bargaining
167. Id. at 585-86.
168. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 481 U.S. at 588-89 n.12.
169. Id. at 585.
170. Id. at 585-86 n.8.
171. 64 F.3d 465 (9th Cir. 1995), denying enforcement of 311 N.L.R.B. 758 (1993), ajfd,
Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 104 v. Henry, 1992 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 856 (N.L.R.B. July
15, 1992).
172. Id. at 467.
173. Id. at 468.
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agreement, constituted "interpretation" that would somehow
bring [the supervisor-member] within the protection of Section
8(b)(l)(B). Under such reasoning, every supervisor would fall
within the protection of Section 8(b)(1)(B) by reason of his or
her routine acts.
174
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the NLRB's determination that the
supervisor-member's correction of mistakes in the payment of travel pay
was "grievance adjustment":
Were we to classify the travel pay problem as a grievance and
[the supervisor-member's] correction of that problem as
grievance adjustment, once again every line supervisor would be
converted by his or her routine activities into a Section
8(b)(1)(B) representative for purposes of protection from union
discipline. As we have said, Congress did not intend to cast its
net that widely in enacting the section. 1
75
Under these controlling authorities, and because section 8(b)(1)(B)
duties are very narrowly defined, hyphenates in the motion picture and
television industry walk a fine line during a strike. As long as hyphenates
remain members of the WGA, those who cross a picket line to perform
regular supervisory duties will remain protected from discipline only if
those duties relate to adjustment of disputes over application of a collective
bargaining agreement, or if the hyphenates are actually involved in
collective bargaining or a closely related activity. The Court's decision in
American Broadcasting Cos. provides support for the position that certain
hyphenates actually do perform contract interpretation or grievance
adjustment duties. However, other hyphenates with those same job titles
may not necessarily perform the same kinds of functions. Job duties vary
depending on the production. Accordingly, the determination of whether a
hyphenate is a grievance adjuster or contract interpreter must be made on a
case by case basis, depending on the individual's actual job duties on a
given production. 1
76
Regardless of whether supervisor-members may be protected under
section 8(b)(1)(B) from union discipline for crossing a picket line,
employers are likely to order these hyphenates to return to work. If they
refuse to report to work, hyphenates risk violating the terms of their
personal services contracts.177  If hyphenates obey their employer's
174. Id.
175. Id. at 470.
176. See, e.g., Am. Broad. Cos., 437 U.S. at 412.
177. One consequence of breaching an employment contract is, of course, termination of the
employment relationship. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.2 (2d ed. 1999).
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direction to return to work, but are later found not to be section 8(b)(1)(B)
supervisors, then they may be subject to discipline by the WGA.'78 Of
course, as discussed in Section IV.A, hyphenates, like any other union
member, can opt for financial core status and avoid the dilemma
altogether.1 79  Moreover, because hyphenates are supervisors, employers
are not prohibited from informing them, or even from requesting that they
become financial core dues payors.180
Arguably, an employer may be constrained from insisting that a
supervisor elect financial core status, where the supervisor's personal
services contract requires the hyphenate to become a WGA "member."
However, such a provision likely has the same meaning in the context of a
personal services contract as it does in a collective bargaining agreement-
that membership requires only the payment of financial core dues and
fees. 1 8 1  Accordingly, a personal services contract should not prevent an
employer from requesting that a hyphenate assume financial core status.
Moreover, during a strike, a producer may require that the hyphenate
resign from the union altogether.182 This is so because upon expiration of
the WGA Agreement, the union security clause expires as well.1 83 Under
these circumstances, the collective bargaining agreement would not require
even the payment of financial core dues and fees. In any event, whether
the hyphenate is a financial core dues payor, or has completely resigned
However, questions related to the suspension and/or termination of personal services contracts of
both writers and hyphenates during a strike require analysis of complex legal issues arising under
the NLRA and the WGA Agreement and are, therefore, beyond the scope of this Article.
178. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
179. See discussion supra Part W.A. However, electing financial core status does not
necessarily eliminate the dilemma a hyphenate may experience when in the uncomfortable
position of having to take actions that directly undermine the WGA's strike objectives. See
Writers Guild of Am., West, 217 N.L.R.B. at 968. For example, one of a producer's main job
duties is helping to find and hire writers. During a strike, a producer could be required to actively
recruit replacement writers. Because hiring writers is a supervisory duty assigned to producers, it
would be proper for an employer to insist that a producer continue to hire writers during a strike.
Id.
180. See discussion supra Part III.B.
181. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
182. See Fla. Power & Light, 417 U.S. at 812 n.22.
183. Syscon Int'l, 322 N.L.R.B. 539, 544 n.5 (1996) (citing Indus. Union of Marine
Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 615, 619 (3d Cir. 1963)); Bethlehem Steel Company, 136
N.L.R.B. 1500 (1962) (holding it was lawful for an employer to unilaterally discontinue union-
security clause upon expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, because section 8(a)(3)
prohibits a union security provision without mutual agreement of the parties), enforcement denied
on other grounds, 320 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1963).
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from the union, the hyphenate may work during a strike without the risk of
union discipline.1
8 4
V. CONCLUSION
Becoming a financial core dues payor is not a panacea for all of the
hardships that writers and performers endure during a labor strike.
However, for some writers and performers who are not concerned about
losing some of the benefits of union membership, or enduring possible
criticism from their peers, it offers a reasonable alternative to long-term
unemployment. For hyphenates, who must perform a delicate balancing
act when determining whether to work during a strike, financial core status
may have even more appeal. At any rate, union members should not be
misled by misinformation about the purported repercussions of electing
financial core status. Instead, union members should make informed
decisions about union membership, based on an accurate understanding of
their legal rights and obligations.
184. See Writers Guild of Am., West, 217 N.L.R.B. at 967 (noting that "[t]he supervisor-
member is, of course, not bound to retain his union membership absent a union security clause,
and if, for whatever reason, he chooses to resign from the union, thereby relinquishing his union
benefits, he could no longer be disciplined by the union for working during a strike ... " (quoting
Fla. Power & Light, 417 U.S. at 812 n.22)). In American Broadcasting Cos., hyphenates did not
have the option of resigning from the WGA during a strike, because, at that time, the WGA
Constitution prohibited resignations during a strike. Am. Broadcasting Cos., 437 U.S. at 436.
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